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From the end of the Cold War, through the process of globalization, national security has 
transitioned from an idea of purely state versus state interaction into a concept including 
both state and non-state actors.  The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), once 
the counter balance to the Soviet Union, has evolved into an alliance that has expanded 
its attention to include non-state actors, such as international terrorist organizations. 
Scholars have theorized on the lifespan of NATO post-Cold War, however the majority of 
these theories have focused on state versus state issues, a common paradigm of the 20th 
century, and not included state versus non-state issues, such as international terrorism.  
As NATO continues to be a post-Cold War, state alliance has it been able to transition to 
a relevant counter terrorism force and reduce the number of terrorist attacks within each 
member state, the alliance as a whole, and/or in the international community?  With 
statistical data of terrorist attacks within NATO member states from the Global Terrorism 
Database this study focuses on each new member that joined during three influential time 
periods before and after the end of the Cold War in order to determine if becoming a 
member correlates to an increase or decrease in the number of terrorist attacks.  
Complementing the statistical data is a content analysis of NATO Summit Declarations in 
order to determine the combined strategies of each member state in reference to 
international terrorism.  According to the findings of the statistical data, I hypothesize that 
each state will have experienced a decrease in terrorist attacks within their borders after 
becoming a member of NATO.  The content analysis will illustrate that the alliance has 
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Introduction: The Journey from Red Scare to Terror 
 
Globalization and international terrorism are intricately intertwined forces perceived as 
the most dangerous threat to international security in the twenty-first century.  
Globalization has enabled non-state actors to reach across international borders, in the 
same way and through the same channels that business interests are linked. The 
elimination of barriers through the North American Free Trade Area and the European 
Union, for instance, has facilitated the smooth flow of many things, good and bad, 
between countries (Cronin, 2003). The increased permeability of the international system 
has also enhanced the ability of non-state organizations to collect intelligence as well as 
counter it; states are not the only actors interested in collecting, disseminating, and/or 
profiting from such information. Terrorists have greater access to powerful technologies, 
potential targets, ungoverned territory, elaborate means of recruitment, and more 
exploitable sources of civil grievances than ever before.   
The objectives of international terrorism have also changed as a result of 
globalization. Foreign occupations and shrinking global space have created opportunities 
to utilize this ideal asymmetrical weapon, for more ambitious purposes.  International 
terrorism is in many ways becoming like any other global enterprise. But the benefit of 
globalization is that the international response to terrorist networks has sparked 
increasing, state to state cooperation on law enforcement, intelligence, and especially 
financial controls being areas of notable recent innovation (Cronin, 2003).  The 
globalization of terrorism is perhaps the current leading threat to long-term stability in the 
international system.  
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Today the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has performed as the 
primary opposition to international terrorism, a tactic used by non-state actors.  The 
alliance was originally forged as a state-state institution in opposition to the expansion of 
another state-state entity, the USSR.  Under a multi-polarity or uni-polarity international 
system, differences in definitions and perceptions over proposed threats likely lead to 
internal divisions within the alliance, undermining cohesion. State to state alliances are 
more likely to survive in conditions of bipolarity, if they are in fact birthed as a response 
to an external threat.  Neo-realists believe that the world now experiences uni-polarity 
since the end of the Cold War, and assume the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will 
slowly fall apart. Many have theorized the alliance’s inevitable demise, only to be proven 
wrong by its continuing existence.  Numerous studies have been conducted to understand 
and challenge theories of the lifespan of the alliance, mostly focusing on the macro level, 
while this study will focus one function, specifically on the counterterrorism efforts of 
NATO.   
The relevance of the alliance has been a matter of discussion among scholars, 
politicians, and military strategists since its inception after World War II.  Born out of the 
threat perceptions of the Soviet Union by an alliance of democratic nations in the North 
Atlantic, the organization has continued its maturity even as those threats have shifted, 
along with the respective perceptions.  While the alliance has remained twenty four years 
and counting after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, it is arguably not the same 
institution as it was once realized, but an evolved version to fit the world as we know it 
today. As NATO continues to be a post-Cold War, state alliance has it been able to 
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transition to a relevant counter terrorism force and reduce the number of terrorist attacks 
within each member state, the alliance as a whole, and/or in the international community? 
As NATO entered the post-Cold War era, uncertainty remained as to whether a 
shared identity would be enough to maintain the Alliance in the absence of any 
overarching threat to its ideology. NATO’s 1991 New Strategic Concept had accurately 
forecasted that future threats from NATO were likely to come from ‘ethnic rivalries and 
territorial disputes’ in Central and Eastern Europe, but the alliance proved unprepared to 
deal with those threats as they appeared (Hallams, 2009). While European members 
were pressing forwards with the European Security and Defence Policy, the Americans 
were pushing to implement the Defence Capabilities Initiative that had been launched at 
the 1999 Washington Summit in an effort to encourage the European members to 
address the obvious lack of capabilities that the Balkan conflict highlighted. 
The apparent success of NATO’s peacekeeping operations in the Balkans had 
less to do with its organizational strength than with the overwhelming military capability 
of British and US forces. However, this success helped NATO alleviate the political 
pressure to change its charter, keeping the organization’s original architecture intact; by 
2000, the issue was all but forgotten since NATO appeared to have made the transition 
from a defensive organization to a peacekeeping one without any major structural 
changes (Chavez, 2003).  The old charter was able to remain unaltered, and NATO 
continued to exist without resolving arguments among its member states over its future 
role.  The delicate balance unraveled when the United States fell victim to the first major 
attack against a NATO country in 2001.  Article V, while intended as a collective security 
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agreement against a Soviet attack, now obligated NATO members into supporting the US 
in a situation they were not prepared for militarily.  
Because of the multi-functionality of the alliance, it is necessary to consider the 
different sets of institutions with particular issue areas, suggesting varied degrees of 
institutionalization.  Therefore, one measure of effectiveness will be NATO’s ability to 
pass the functions of collective security from the organization as a whole to each of the 
member states (Webber, Sperling, Smith, 2012). Asset portability has assisted NATO in 
its transformation from an exclusive, threat-focused entity, to an inclusive, risk-focused 
security institution.   
“We need, in short, to ensure we do not lose our core combat competencies and 
structures as we embrace new missions. Collective defense remains the 
fundamental purpose of NATO and should be the basis for a rational 
transformation of the Alliance to respond to new demands. Nonarticle V 
capabilities are derivative from article V requirements—not the reverse.  We also 
need to preserve and build on structures and procedures that enable 16 sovereign 
nations to discuss and agree to political objectives, then transform the objectives 
into guidance for NATO military authorities. This is a unique strength of NATO 
which must be preserved.” (Christman, 1996)   
In regards to counterterrorism campaigns, if membership to NATO enhanced a member’s 
ability to detect, disrupt, or destroy possible attacks or the organizations that plan them, 
a likely outcome would be a decrease in terrorist activity in and around that member state.   
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NATO’s existence since the attacks of 11 September 2001 has been more about 
the fight than the defense. Instead of positioning equipment and personnel and waiting to 
be attacked in Europe, the Alliance has operated in locations that were never 
considerations during the Cold War, such as Afghanistan, Libya, Iraq, and the Gulf of 
Aden.  Member states have shed blood and sustained operations such as International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan that have gone on longer than both 
World Wars combined. They may have been only able to resource small contingents in 
the field, but after the prolonged combat experience in Afghanistan, these forces are more 
versatile, battle-tested, better equipped, and therefore more useful than the larger, mainly 
static European forces of the previous twenty years.  Indeed one of NATO’s key 
challenges upon completion of its combat role in Afghanistan is to preserve the 
connectivity, interoperability, and readiness that it has achieved in recent operations.   
In the 2010 Lisbon Summit, NATO admitted its need for its own “modest civilian 
capability to interface more effectively with other actors and conduct appropriate planning 
in crisis management.”  Ironically this epiphany came after three decades of counter 
terrorism efforts shifting from a law enforcement model to a military reaction model, 
punctuated by the events of and following 11 September 2001.   All of these polices, 
initiatives, summits, and conferences will be of great value in the analysis of NATO’s 
perception of international terrorism, a non-state actor, as a threat to the international 
community, the alliance as a whole, and to each of the members: all state actors. 
Since the end of the Cold War collective security theorists believe that the 
international environment is more conducive for states to cooperate, sharing values and 
interests. The preservation of NATO, even since the end of the Cold War and the Soviet 
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threat, appeared as confirmation that international cooperation could outlast the initial 
realist-inspired conditions for that institution (Dannreuther, 2013).  Unfortunately the 
alliance has remained an institution limited to providing a military response to terror 
threats, lacking the civilian resources to address a more comprehensive approach.  NATO 
members have evolved in their threat perceptions, ranging from weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) proliferation, to failing states on the European periphery, to organized 
crime, to international terrorism, and even illegal or uncontrolled migration.  As many 
scholars as well as counterterrorism experts and operators argue, quality and robust 
intelligence gathering is key to understanding and defeating terror organizations.  
It is widely known across the member states that threat perception of international 
terrorism takes many forms.  In an alliance of differing loyalties and economic interest, 
how the organization identifies, defines, and prioritizes terrorist threats is a constant 
struggle.  David Lake suggests that there appear to be situations in which nations sacrifice 
some of their sovereignty (both economically and through security to the United States) 
and that when these hierarchical relationships exist the subordinate nations lower their 
defense efforts (Lake, 2007).  Whereas the United States almost doubled its defense 
spending after 2001 in response to the September 11, 2001 attacks, and had spent nearly 
two trillion US dollars on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Europeans have cut their 
defense spending since 2008 by between 10 to 15 percent. This is not likely to be a short-
term phenomenon but rather a long-term decline (Hillison, 2014).  The consensus 
principle has been the sole basis for Alliance decision-making since NATO’s creation in 
1949. It applies for all bodies and committees (Public Diplomacy, 2013).  A shared 
consensus of what leads to terrorist activity, the players involved, or the likely effects on 
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the population would be an epic achievement in itself, however would be short lived due 
to the ever evolving and changing terrorist organizations that exist. 
Terror campaigns, like battles in conventional warfare, are difficult to limit and 
control once they have begun, often resulting in collateral damage and other tragedies to 
civilians caught up in the violence.  Even when terrorists’ actions are not as deliberate or 
discriminating, and their purpose is in fact to kill innocent civilians, the target is still 
regarded as “justified” because it represents the defined “enemy.”  Although attacks may 
be quantitatively different in the volume of death, damage, or destruction caused, they 
are still qualitatively identical in that a widely known “enemy” is being specifically targeted 
(Hoffman, 2013). This distinction is often accepted by a terrorist organization’s 
constituents and at times by the international community as well.  Terrorist organizations 
are able to maintain success depending on their ability to keep one step ahead of 
authorities and counter terrorist technology.  The terrorist organization’s fundamental 
imperative to act also drives the persistent search for new ways to circumvent or defeat 
governmental security and countermeasures.  
During the 1970s and 1980s terrorism achieved a firmly international character, 
evolving in part as a result of technological advances and the height of state-sponsorship 
terrorism, an attractive tool for accomplishing a state’s clandestine goals while avoiding 
potential retaliation for the attacks.  Individual, scattered national causes began to 
develop into international organizations with links and activities increasingly across 
borders and among differing causes. Sometimes the lowest common denominator among 
the groups was the shared, perceived enemy against which they were reacting rather 
than the specific goals they sought.  
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In the post-Cold War era, terrorists aimed to exploit the frustrations of the common 
people, especially in the developing world where reforms occurred at a pace much slower 
than was desired. David Rapoport argues that modern terrorism is part of a larger 
phenomenon of anti-globalization and tension between the have and have-not nations, 
as well as between the elite and underprivileged within those nations (Rapoport, 2001). 
The jihad era is animated by widespread alienation combined with elements of religious 
identity and doctrine, a dangerous mix of forces that resonate deep in the human psyche 
(Cronin, 2003). As states continued their own transitioning from the former bi-polar world 
system to the new uni-polar world order, their populations often suffered the brunt of the 
growing pains. 
Both the international system and international terrorism have experienced critical 
events to their evolution over the last four decades.  The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 
coupled with the Iranian revolution of 1979 was the launch pad from which modern 
international terrorism sprang forth.  After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
international system experienced massive shock waves, on which terrorist organizations 
rode to newer, more modern methods and ideologies.  Sparked by the fantastic events of 
11 September 2001, the international system again was jolted into an era of warfare 
against international terrorism, creating incredible leaps in the technology of globalization.  
This study will pay particular attention to these three time periods:  (1) 1979 – 1991, 
beginning with the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, (2) 1991 – 
2001, defined by the collapse of the Soviet Union and end to the bipolar world order, and 
(3) 2001 – (dependent on available data), after the attacks on 11 September 2001, when 
international terrorism became a stated, perceived threat in NATO doctrine.  A statistical 
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analysis of terrorist attacks within member states, coupled with a content analysis of 
NATO doctrine and publications will shed light on the alliance’s ability to transition to the 

















The Importance of Institutions 
         
In order to properly frame my analysis, I must begin from the building blocks of the 
Alliance and proper selection of timeframe for measurement.  Examining the function of 
counter terrorism without the context of terrorism itself would produce insufficient results.  
Therefore, the framework for this study will be anchored on the neoliberal institutionalism 
theory of several scholars in regards to NATO, and the four waves of terrorism theory 
posited by David Rapoport.  The combination of these theories allow for a robust, time 
based analysis of NATO’s trajectory as an alliance with a valid, counter terrorism function. 
 
NATO and Its Institutions 
The bargains struck and institutions created at the building of NATO have not simply 
persisted for almost 70 years, but they have actually become more deeply rooted in the 
structures of politics and society of the member states. That is, more people and more of 
their activities are linked to the institutions and operations of the alliance. A wider array of 
individuals and groups, in more countries and more realms of activity, have a stake, or a 
vested interest, in the continuation of NATO’s existence. The costs of disruption or 
change in this system have steadily grown over the decades, meaning that alternative 
institutions are at a disadvantage. The system is increasingly hard to dismantle or replace. 
This study will enhance the scholarship on NATO’s existence with respect to 
examining the alliance through the lens of neoliberal institutionalism.  Several previous 
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works have measured the relevancy of NATO as a whole, as a state to state alliance, 
balancing against another state entity.  Particularly, the recent publication from Webber, 
Sperling and Smith, examines the alliance’s trajectory as either decline or regeneration 
using neoliberal institutionalism theory as one of their arguments.  Expanding on this 
work, this study focuses on a particular function of the alliance (counter terrorism), 
illustrating the applicability of theory to the current international environment of states 
balancing against non-state entities.  As the theory holds to the organization as a whole, 
so it should apply to each of the numerous functions of the alliance.  
Whether concerned with relative-gains or absolute-gains, there is common 
agreement that states act within the rational choice model.  The preservation of NATO, 
even since the end of the Cold War and the Soviet threat, appeared as confirmation that 
international cooperation could outlast the initial realist-inspired conditions for that 
institution (Dannreuther, 2013).  Keohane explains that it is more difficult to create a 
regime, rather than to maintain one (2005).  Stein explains that although power or 
interests might shift drastically within a regime, there are reasons why they will continue 
to exist (1982).  Stein finds that there are two possible explanations for this: the nations 
are not continuously calculating their “interactions and transactions” and that 
“[i]nstitutional maintenance is not, then a function of a waiving of calculation; it becomes 
a factor in the decision calculus that keeps short-term calculations from becoming 
decisive” (1982).  Both authors explain that states may also maintain institutions because 
of their concern for their reputation (Keohane 2005, Stein 1982).  Since the end of the 
Cold War collective security theorists believe that the international environment is more 
conducive for states to cooperate, sharing values and interests.  
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Lake (2007) challenges the assumption that anarchy is the ordering principle of 
the system, and argues that it might actually be hierarchy. The author explains that 
because these theories are based on the legal interpretation of authority, which equates 
law and authority, that “from this conception that international politics lack authority [, 
b]ecause there is no lawful position or institution above the state, there can be no authority 
above the state” (2007). This naturally leads to the assumption that the international 
system must be dominated by a constant state of anarchy.  Lake proposes a change in 
the view that authority stems from a contract that is devised between the rulers and ruled. 
In this view the people are able to challenge the rule and therefore authority becomes no 
longer based on law, but contract (2007). This conceptual shift allows an examination of 
the level of hierarchy that may be present in the international system without a world 
government, or within the NATO alliance, which is the only way that realism and neoliberal 
institutionalism are able to conceptualize hierarchy in the system.  
A more powerful state can go beyond internal openness to establish formal, 
institutional links with less powerful states, limiting state autonomy and allowing the 
weaker states to have a “say” in the decision-making of the more powerful state. These 
binding institutional strategies have been explored by Joseph Grieco and Daniel 
Deudney. Grieco argues that weaker states within the European Union (EU) have had an 
incentive to create institutional links with stronger states so as to have a "voice" in how 
the strong states exercise their power, thereby preventing domination of the weaker by 
the stronger states (Greico, 1993).  
"States . . . are likely to assign great significance to the enjoyment of such effective 
voice opportunities in a cooperative arrangement, for it may determine whether 
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states can obtain redress if they are concerned about such matters as the 
compliance of stronger partners with their commitments in the arrangement, or 
imbalances in the division of otherwise mutually positive gains that may be 
produced by their joint effort.” 
Weak states are likely to find institutionalized collaboration with stronger states attractive 
if it provides mechanisms to influence the policy of the stronger states. 
Relationships among the more developed, industrial countries since the end of the 
Cold War are characterized by an increasingly dense web of state to state institutions that 
are drawing more governments and more functional parts of these governments into the 
extended postwar Western political order. This means that great shifts in the basic 
organization of the Western order are increasingly costly to a widening array of individuals 
and groups that make up the order (Ikenberry, 1999). More and more people have a stake 
in the system, even if they have no particular loyalty or to the United States or its allies 
and even if they might really prefer a different order. Through the years, the operating 
institutions of the Western order have grown and become even more complex. Any radical 
change to the existing system would severely disrupt the lives of a growing number of 
people.  This inevitably preserves the post-World War II political order among the major 
first world countries. It is in this sense that the lifespan of NATO is stable and growing.  
Neorealist theories are inadequate to explain both the durability of Western order 
and its important features, such as its extensive institutionalization and the consensual 
and reciprocal character of relations within it. Neoliberal institutionalists agree that states 
act in their own interests, yet hold a more optimistic view on cooperation.  They focus 
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exclusively on absolute gains, while neorealist paradigm provokes states to seek out 
relative gains. This is important because, unlike the rational egoistic, i.e. atomistic state 
understanding of neoliberal institutionalists, Grieco argues that states bare a character 
with concerns of survival, lacking any central agency to protect them (1988). To be sure, 
decades of balancing against Soviet power reinforced cooperation among these 
countries, but the basic organization of Western order predated the Cold War and 
survives today without it. In contrast to some realist orthodoxy that forecast a collapse of 
order in the absence of hegemony, Keohane argued that cooperation, can operate if 
interests sufficiently converge and institutions are appropriate (2015). The success of the 
World Trade Organization over the last twenty years in preventing a return to 
protectionism supports this argument. Continued cooperation among the major 
democratic countries on issues ranging from terrorism to human rights challenges to the 
world financial crisis of 2008 also support Keohane’s argument. 
Neoliberals agree with neorealist assumptions that states are unitary and rational 
actors, and anarchy is the major force in shaping state actions. The fact that these two 
theories focus on behavioral regularities, and the state-centric focus on addressing issues 
that disrupt the status quo, show clear evidence of synthesis. The evolution of both 
neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism has resulted in these theories falling under one 
header (Whyte, 2012).   It was the exercise of strategic restraint, made good by an open 
polity and binding institutions, more than the direct and instrumental exercise of 
hegemonic domination that ensured a cooperative and stable postwar order. For all these 
reasons, it is necessary to look beyond neorealism for an understanding of order among 
the advanced industrial societies. 
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Neorealist theories also expect that the gradual decline of American power, 
magnified by the Cold War, should also lead to rising conflict and institutional disarray. 
Institutionalized rules can increase the cooperation and discourage cheating in various 
ways. They raise the cost of cheating by instilling fear in “the shadow of future”; they allow 
for reciprocation, or a tit-for-tat strategy, to pay back the cheater in the future; and finally 
they reward and punish states for good and bad reputations, respectively (Axelrod and 
Keohane, 1985). Therefore, institutions that provide information and lower transaction 
costs can solve this problem. Recently, some realists have argued that it is actually the 
extreme preponderance of American power, and not its decline, that will trigger 
counterbalancing reactions by Asian and European allies. 
Neoliberal institutionalism assumes that states are rational actors, maximizing 
utility, differing from neo-realism in the value it places on institutions.  This value is defined 
as cooperation to overcome mistrust, uncertainty in intentions, high transaction cost, and 
collective action problems, as well as providing a platform for policy coordination.  
Neorealists have a hard time believing that cooperation can exist without a coercive 
power and feel that uncertainty is obstructing international cooperation (Grieco, 1988); 
whereas neoliberals attempt to explain cooperation by combining international institutions 
into the neorealist picture. Neoliberal institutionalism seems to explain cooperation in 
cases where state interests are not fundamentally opposed (Keohane, 2005; Axelrod and 
Keohane, 1985). One key solution to the dilemma of cheating or defection lies in 
collaboration and cooperation that involves monitoring, sanctioning and bargaining (Stein, 
1982).  The idea here is to mitigate the threat of cheating, i.e. defection.  For neoliberal 
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institutionalists the meaning of anarchy is reflected as the fear of cheating and lack of 
cooperation, which can be mitigated through institutions.  
A central tenet of neoliberal institutionalism is the defense of cooperation and 
importance of international regimes, primarily because these are the only grounds on 
which they differ from realism (Grieco 1988).  Keohane recognized that cooperation is not 
an easily attained, but states could potentially benefit from cooperative strategies 
(Keohane, 2005). Institutions provide a coordinating mechanism to help states capture 
potential gains from cooperation; this “constructed focal point” increases the opportunity 
of cooperative outcomes (Keohane, R, O., &, Martin, 1995).  Institutions reflect the 
distribution of power of states; and they are assumed to have little influence on state 
behavior. The purpose of international regimes is that “International regimes by no means 
substitute for bargaining; on the contrary, they authorize certain types of bargaining for 
certain purposes” (Keohane, 2005). Therefore, Keohane cautions for the distinction 
between a state’s bargaining power and its relative gains. Bargaining and repeated 
interaction between states might solve the relative gains issue through institutions. 
Coherence is also a property of institutions, but refers more to the relationship among 
institutions than to the properties of any single institution (Keohane, n.d.). Coherent 
institutions or clusters of institutions have clear lines of authority linking them, so that for 
any given situation it is clear which rules apply, or at least which adjudicatory institutions 
are authorized to determine which rules apply. 
 Because their chief function is to achieve coordinated action among states and 
other actors, institutions should generate reliable information about coordination points 
and make it available to relevant actors. An institution's legitimacy could be called into 
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question if suboptimal performance persists, and there is an acceptable alternative 
institution that could be created without excessive transition costs (Buchanan & Keohane, 
2011).  Institutions must have the capacity to revise their goals and processes over time 
as circumstances dictate, and this in turn requires the capacity to revise the terms of 
accountability through a process of principled deliberation that ultimately leads to 
consensus. 
Alliances have often been formed not only as a primary balance against external 
threats, but also to allow alliance partners to manage joint relations. Traditionally, 
alliances have been seen as temporary cooperation that bring states together for mutual 
security assurance in the face of a common threat, a commitment specified in a particular 
portion of the treaty. But as Paul Schroeder and others have noted, alliances have also 
been created as pacts of restraint. They have served as mechanisms for states to manage 
and restrain their partners within the alliance. "Frequently the desire to exercise such 
control over an ally's policy," Schroeder argues, "was the main reason that one power, or 
both, entered into the alliance." Alliances create binding treaties that allow states to keep 
a hand in the security policy of their partners (Schroeder, 1975).  When alliance treaties 
restrain each of the members, potential rivals tie themselves to each other, alleviating 
suspicions, reducing uncertainties, and creating institutional mechanisms for each to 
influence the policies of the other. 
Within NATO, cooperation depends on mutual interests that have continued to 
develop over the last half century.  Institutionalist approaches are usually seen as more 
appropriate in the field of political economy than security. (Lipson, 1984)  Webber, 
Sperling and Smith argue that institutions are still important to security as they assist in 
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overcoming obstacles of cooperation.  During NATO’s Cold War incarnation, the alliance 
fulfilled the functional needs of its members through the development of institutional 
assets that both addressed the Soviet threat and helped to promote pacific relations allies 
(Wallander, 1999). Security cooperation institutions within the alliance were born from 
non-adversarial relationships.  
Furthermore, institutions provide an arbitrary body that is able to provide states 
with information preventing states from cheating. In general the negotiation process is 
rapid since member countries consult on a regular basis and therefore often know each 
other’s position in advance. The consensus principle has been the sole basis for Alliance 
decision-making since NATO’s creation in 1949. It applies for all bodies and committees 
(Public Diplomacy, 2013).  As explained in the game theory, more specifically Prisoners 
dilemma, states seek to maximize individual pay-offs, and so institutions offer a platform 
through which greater coordination and cooperation can be executed, subsequently 
benefitting both parties.  
Neoliberal Institutionalism is a theoretical approach that attempts to explain 
International Relations with concepts of rationality and bargaining in an institutionalized 
environment. The central argument of this approach is that cooperation may be a rational 
strategy for states “under certain conditions” (Keohane 2005).  Neoliberal institutionalism 
retains concern with formal organized activity between states, so has found an application 
in the case of NATO’s counter-terrorism efforts.  A NATO that is under-institutionalized 
would be less able to stem disagreement and non-compliance, and so effectiveness of 
the alliance would diminish. If member states were to marginalize or abandon institutions 
that lag behind security challenges would put the alliance into a trajectory of decline 
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(Webber et al, 2012).  The likelihood of NATO meeting new and multiple security 
challenges, persisting as an effective actor, rises with institutional adaptation and the 
development of portable institutional assets.  Institutional adaptation decreases the 
probability of non-compliance brought about by NATO’s more complex agenda and 
increasing number of members.  
The relevance of NATO can be determined by the effectiveness of its functions 
and the commitment by each member state to carrying out those functions.  Applying the 
theory of neoliberal institutionalism to a specific function of NATO with the use of the 
proposed methods of analysis, this study will enhance existing scholarship on the 
relevancy of the alliance.  Based on the current international environment and the 
increasing influences of non-state actors, state to state alliances and their members must 
adapt their functions to remain effective and relevant. This theory will be effective in future 
evaluation of other functions of NATO even outside the security realm.   
 
Terrorism Across Time 
The definition of terrorism is varied not only across the member states of NATO, but also 
varied within government agencies of each nation.  In the US, the Departments of State 
and Defense, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency all 
consider slightly different versions as the official definition.  The term was introduced into 
our language in 1795 during the French Revolution.  By 1879, almost a hundred years 
later, the concept appeared again in Russia as a tactic used by rebel forces seeking a 
change in the social order.  David Rapoport observes four waves since the late 1870s, 
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the first three lasting approximately twenty to forty years.  Rapoport’s argument is set 
apart from other theories because of its emphasis on generational waves of terrorism 
(Rapoport, 2001). The first wave began in Russia and was largely the result of slow 
democratization processes.  The predominant strategy of this generation was the 
assassination of authority figures, sometimes financed through bank robberies.  The 
technological changes in the world’s communication and transportation also facilitated 
large-scale emigration from various parts of Europe to more democratic political systems, 
thereby creating sympathetic audiences abroad.  
 
Rapaport's Waves of Terrorism 
1ST  2ND  3RD  4TH  
1880 - 1915 1920 - 1955 1965 - 1985 1979 - ?? 
 
 
World War I, ignited by the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand of Austria-
Hungary, encouraged reforms and revolution which softened the incentives for anarchic 
terrorists.  Meanwhile, the post-war treaties helped to delegitimize colonies and empires 
by breaking up the imperial and colonial structures of the defeated powers and 
establishing supposedly temporary mandate arrangements. On the other hand the victors 
were able to maintain their empires, but were not able to erase the concept of national 
self-determination. Therefore, the second wave of terrorism focused on dissident efforts 
to discourage European occupation of overseas territories, particularly in areas such as 
Ireland, Palestine, and Algeria where the local populace preferred their colonial status 
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quo in comparison to what independence might bring (Rasler & Thompson, 2009). 
Although World War II extended the second wave of terrorism, it quickly ushered the 
dismantling of the remaining European empires. Consequently, this second wave of 
terrorism produced by nationalists and anti-colonial groups gradually tapered off.  
A third wave of terrorism, centered on Marxist revolution, dominated the last third 
of the twentieth century. Tactics such as assassinations resurfaced, along with the 
hijackings of airplanes and public offices, as well as the kidnapping of individuals whose 
release required concessions or ransoms. Terrorism as a strategy was also reinforced by 
the Viet Cong’s abilities to outlast the political will of the United States to maintain a 
military presence in Vietnam. Within the Cold War context, training and support for 
terrorists became internationalized, as did the targets of terrorist attacks. The end of the 
Cold War and the international community’s sustained resistance to these terrorist 
demands eventually led to the waning of this wave by the 1980s.  
The fourth wave coincided with the introduction of two major events in southwest 
Asia. The first event occurred with the overthrow of the Shah in Iran, bringing to power 
Islamic clerics who sought to ‘‘export the revolution.’’ In the same year, the Soviet Union 
invaded Afghanistan in an attempt to save a client regime against an internal revolt, 
mobilizing Muslims to wage a holy war against the infidels (Rapoport, 2001). The fourth 
wave of terrorism quickly assumed a strongly religious orientation. Eventually, terrorism 
spread to include actions from radical wings of other religions in reaction to militant Islam. 
Suicide bombings and a strong emphasis on attacking U.S. targets emerged in order to 
encourage American withdrawal from the Middle East.  
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The general pattern is not one of random and unstructured violence. Each wave 
has a life cycle with initial expansion and contraction phases which are influenced by the 
number of terrorist organizations in operation and the intensity of their attacks. Terrorist 
organizations that survive the contractionary phase of the wave in which they originated, 
adapt by taking on the operational characteristics and tactics that appear in the next wave 
of terrorism. The duration of each wave depends on a myriad of explanations: the 
presence or lack of successes attributable to terrorism, the resilience of terrorist 
organizations, and the effectiveness of states’ responses to terrorist claims and tactics 
(Rasler & Thompson, 2009). Duration also may be contingent on generational differences 
associated with terrorists’ aspirations and calculations about what works and what does 
not seem to be efficacious. Or, it may be that new generations simply find it easier to 
break with older strategies that have lost their allure. The central motivation for terrorism 
in each wave is distinctive as are the tactics that are most likely to be employed. The 
violence is carried out by non-state organizations and is directed at states and their 
populations deemed to be antagonistic to the aims of revolutionary organizations. 
Terrorists, including some of their targets, are apt to view their conflict as warfare, albeit 
an unconventional form of warfare. Yet, the one recurring pattern in terrorism waves is 
their limited duration. Each wave is likely to play itself out and to be replaced by a new 
wave of terrorism that is centered on a motivation that is as difficult to predict as the timing 
of the next upsurge.  
Enders and Sandler examined time series of terrorist activity and found break 
points in the mid-1970s, early 1990s, and 2001 that they attribute to various factors 
(2005). An increase in deaths in 1975 is traced to a rise in the formation of terrorist groups 
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around this time. The early 1990s increase in deaths is said to be due to the decline in 
left-wing groups and to decreases in state sponsorship. After 11 September 2001, Enders 
and Sandler find that bombings increased and hostage-taking decreased. They 
hypothesize that groups became more interested in the amount of carnage that could be 
inflicted. (Enders & Sandler, 2005)  In another evocative study, Thompson, who examined 
a list of terrorism events for the last fifty years of the twentieth century, found that 
nationalist events had declined from a high of 60 percent to less than a quarter (23%) of 
the total terrorism underway.  Ideological terrorism, both left and right, had peaked in the 
1960s at around 53 percent and declined to 27 percent. Religious activity had been 
nonexistent in the 1960s but had risen to 50 percent of the total by the 1990s (Rasler & 
Thompson, 2009). Terrorist movements work much like sectors of economic growth. At 
any point in time, there are old sectors dying off, new ones just getting started, and others 
proceeding more or less in their ‘‘normal’’ growth phase.  Rapoport contends that the 
waves are distinguished by generational-length periods of ideological predominance. 
Understanding the evolution of terrorism across time will allow this study to better 
analyze NATO’s response to this threat.  The theoretical framework provided by David 
Rapoport’s four waves of terrorism enables the measurement of content with regards to 
context between the trajectories of the Alliance and that of terrorist strategies.  Both 
entities seem to evolve in a reactionary pattern, and understanding the major stimuli 
provided by the international system will better assist the study in charting the relevancy 




The Two-sided Mirror of Statistics and Content 
 
Introduction 
For the purposes of this study, I will conduct a two-pronged approach at examining 
NATO’s identity as a counter terrorism force and how it relates to institutions among 
member states and the number of terrorist attacks experienced within each state.  The 
first approach will be the statistical analysis of the number of events associated with 
NATO members, bringing a quantitative dimension to the research.  The second 
approach will be the analysis of counter terrorism content within NATO publications, 
giving the study a qualitative dimension.  I pay particular attention to three time periods:  
(1) 1979 – 1991, (2) 1991 – 2001, and (3) 2001 – 2014, and the member states that joined 
the alliance during these time periods.  The combination of these two methods will afford 
a better understanding of the evolutionary changes or lack thereof within NATO during a 
continual academic debate on the saliency of the alliance.  
 
Time period selection 
Each of the time periods were selected based on historical events that affected the current 
world order.  NATO has continually adjusted its courses of action over the decades, but 
truly only evolved in response to severe, external stimulus. Marking the time periods from 
significant events, and maintaining closely similar lengths of time allow for a more 
consistent measurement.   Using a time period of at least ten years accounts for possible 
25 
 
leadership changes within NATO structure, as well as within the governments of each of 
the member states.  This limits the effect of a single leader personality on the environment 
of each of the states measured.  Therefore, the time parameters are event based, similar 
length, and long enough to avoid personality phenomenon in the data. 
 Two major events are the launch pad for the data collection.  The Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan, and the Iranian Revolution redefined the relationships between the two 
great powers of the world and terrorist organizations.  At the same time, thanks to the 
multiple social and technological factors of globalization, the world was becoming smaller 
and easier to travel.  In the Muslim calendar, 1979 was the start of a new century that 
was supposed to herald the coming of a redeemer according to the faith’s prophecies.  
Islamic extremist at the time viewed the Iranian government as a puppet of the West.  The 
Iranian Revolution began the rule of the more religious regime, illustrating to the region 
that Islam could in fact purify itself from Western influence.  As the Palestinian issue 
continued to metastasize in the 1980s, the new Iranian regime supported the growth of 
terrorist operations within Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley.  As the mujahedeen slowly forced the 
Soviets to withdraw from the mountainous terrain for Afghanistan, key non state actors 
like Osama Bin Laden proved to his followers that a small contingent of guerilla fighters, 
insurgents, and terrorists could defeat a great power.  According to David Rapoport’s 
theory, this timeframe fell under what he called the “third wave of terrorism”.  Rapoport 
constructed a framework that categorized the evolution of international terrorism into 
“waves”, each with its own set of historical events and each with an evolving set of tactics 
(Rapoport, 2001).  The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian Revolution were 
26 
 
the first indicators of the decline of the bipolar world order, and the rise of transnational 
terrorism in the globalizing world. 
 The dissolution of the Soviet Union was a clear disruption to the existing world 
order.  By the end of 1991, the Berlin Wall had been breached, and Soviet flag was 
lowered from Kremlin for the last time.  As the Cold War ended, so did the flow of 
economic and military support from either side to some of the most volatile places on the 
globe. Authoritarian regimes and weak states alike found themselves needing new ways 
to control their populations, continue the flow of patronage to elites, and maintain their 
standard of living.  The end of the Cold War was a defining moment for NATO, the former 
Soviet members and states that had aligned with either side.  
 The events of 11 September 2001 were a wakeup call to most of the modern world. 
For the first time in its history, NATO enacted Article V of its Charter to tend to an area of 
the world that no one had talked about since the withdrawal of the Soviet Union twelve 
years prior.  Rapoport’s fourth wave of terrorism is distinctive as it is religion that is used 
to transcend state bonds and boundaries (2001).  As the Global War on Terrorism vaulted 
in existence, NATO and its members were thoroughly engaged commanding International 
Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, establishing NATO Training Mission – Iraq, 
conducting anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, and eventually intervening in Libya, 
all within a decade since the Al Qaeda attacks in the United States. Member states were 
accelerating cooperation and intelligence sharing, new technologies were developed, and 
membership was being expanded to new states in response to a non-state threat.  Those 
attacks were a clear evolutionary transition point for the international system and how 




NATO has added new members six times since its founding in 1949, starting from the 
original twelve at its founding.  For the purpose of this study, I selected only the member 
states that joined the alliance during the designated time periods. The majority of these 
states were accepted into membership in 1999 and 2004, expanding across two of the 
measured time periods.  The measured states are:  Spain, Czech Republic, Hungary, 




NATO summit meetings are often held at key moments in the Alliance’s evolution. Summit 
meetings provide periodic opportunities for Heads of State and Government of member 
countries to evaluate and provide strategic direction for Alliance activities.  They are not 
regular meetings, but important junctures in the Alliance’s decision-making process.  
These summits are used to introduce new policy, invite new members into the Alliance, 
launch major initiatives and reinforce partnerships.  Since 1949, there have been twenty-
six NATO summits; the last took place in Wales, the United Kingdom, in September 2014.  
NATO summits, chaired by the NATO Secretary General, are always held in a NATO 





NATO summit meetings are effectively a gathering of the principal political 
decision-making body the Alliance, the North Atlantic Council (NAC).  Many of NATO’s 
summit meetings can be considered as milestones in the evolution of the Alliance. Due 
to the political significance of summit meetings, agenda items typically address issues of 
overarching political or strategic importance. Items can relate to the internal functioning 
of the Alliance as well as NATO’s relations with external partners.  From the founding of 
NATO until the end of the Cold War there were ten summit meetings. The first post-Cold 
War summit in 1990 was held in London, and outlined proposals for developing relations 
with Central and Eastern European countries. A year later, in Rome, NATO Heads of 
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State and Government published the new Strategic Concept that reflected a new security 
environment. At the same summit, NATO established the North Atlantic Cooperation 
Council that officially assembled the Alliance and partner countries from Europe, Central 
Asia, and the Caucasus.  The 1997 Madrid and Paris Summits invited the first countries 
of the former Warsaw Pact, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, to join NATO, and 
established partnerships between NATO and Russia and Ukraine, while the 2002 Prague 
Summit pledged major commitments to transforming NATO’s military command structure 
and improving capabilities. 
Since 1990, their frequency has increased considerably in order to address the 
changes brought on by new security challenges. NATO summit meetings can be held in 
any of the member countries, including Belgium, home NATO Headquarters. In recent 
years, summit locations have held some thematic significance. For example, the 1999 
Washington Summit commemorated the 50th anniversary of the signing of the North 
Atlantic Treaty in that city. Istanbul connects Europe and Asia and is where the Alliance 
launched the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative at a summit meeting in 2004. This initiative 
is intended to foster linkages between NATO and the broader Middle East. 
While NATO summit meetings normally involve only member countries, on 
occasion, other formats can be convened, provided Allies agree. They include, for 
instance, meetings of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the NATO-Russia Council, 
the NATO-Ukraine Commission or the NATO-Georgia Commission. As was the case at 
the 2010 Lisbon Summit they can also include top representatives from international 
organizations such as the United Nations, the European Union or the World Bank and 





Typically, the decisions taken at a summit meeting are issued in declarations. 
These are public documents that explain the Alliance's decisions and reaffirm Allies’ 
support for aspects of NATO policies.  The decisions are then translated into action by 
the relevant actors, according to the area of competency and responsibility: the NAC’s 
subordinate committees and NATO’s command structure, which cover the whole range 
of the Organization’s functions and activities.  Based on the actors involved and the level 
of consensus necessary to produce the declarations from summit meetings, these public 
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documents are ideal for examining the way in which the Alliance as a whole views its role 
in the current security environment.   
 
Method 1: Quantitative – Statistical Analysis 
I examined the number of terrorist attacks experienced by each member state, NATO as 
a whole, and the international community during each of the time periods.  This data can 
be obtained from an existing database, the Global Terrorism Database (GTD).  This data 
can be grouped by nation, by type of attack, or by perpetrator. Based on the number of 
attacks experienced by each case during the time periods, I will attempt to determine a 
correlation (not causation) of membership to NATO and number of experienced terrorist 
attacks.  The number of attacks are graphed to show an increase, decrease, or negligible 
change over the selected time periods for each of the cases.  The findings of this research 
will shed light on whether joining NATO could have a positive, negative, or negligible 
effect on the number of terrorist attacks that a new member or NATO may experience.   
 
Hypothesis 1: A noticeable decrease in the number of terrorist attacks experienced by a 
member state over the three designated time periods will indicate a positive outcome to 
joining NATO strengthening the value of institutions that pass along the counter terrorism 




Method 2: Qualitative - Content Analysis 
In order to compliment the findings from the statistical analysis, I will also conduct 
qualitative analysis of official text from NATO Summit Declarations in order to gain a 
clearer picture of the priority of counter terrorism efforts in the alliance as a whole.  
Because the decision process in NATO is built upon total consensus, these documents 
will offer a generalizable view of each member’s stance on combatting international 
terrorism. Within each of the declarations are topic points of differing numbers, some of 
which are solely dedicated to the subject of counter terrorism, while others only mention 
terrorism as a sub-topic.  I will utilize a system of coding that includes the number or times 
the subject of “terrorism”, “terrorists”, or “counter terrorism” is referenced in the document 
as a whole in combination with how many item numbers include the same terms.  In 
addition I will analyze the language used when discussing each of the terms to determine 
the intensity of NATO’s response to the topics.  Based on the framework of the 
declarations, the order and placement of the topics indicate a level of priority for the 
organization, and thus can be analyzed to indicate a high, medium, or low priority relevant 
to the other topics discussed.  Contextually, an analysis of the counter terrorism strategies 
of each member state could offer insight to the varying level of terrorism they experience, 
respectively; however, this could also be affected by regional issues and not state specific 
experiences and are not covered by this analysis. 
 
Hypothesis 2:  Counter terrorism becoming a higher priority in NATO doctrine over each 
of the three time periods will indicate that each member state is in consensus over threat 
33 
 
perception of international terrorism, strengthening the value of institutions that pass 



















What Do the Numbers Mean  
 
PART I – Statistical Analysis of Terrorist Attacks in Member-States  
The data provided by the Global Terrorism Database shows a correlation between the 
joining of NATO and a decrease in the number of terrorist attacks experienced by new 
member states.  However, there were some interesting patterns in the numbers with 
respect to some members and their historical trajectory.  In previous sections I presented 
the importance of the measured time periods with respect to the evolving international 
system.  In this section I will focus my description of the data on the different member 
states and how each member’s background is reflected.  
 
Tables 
The tables are constructed to have the member states in left column, grouped specifically 
by how and when they joined NATO, as well as the situation they came from (former 
Soviet or former Yugoslavia).  The three columns on the right are the number of terrorist 
attacks experienced in each of the time periods indicated. An “x” in the cell indicates that 
country did not exist at that particular time period, and thus had no measurement.  A 
single * indicates the time period in which that country joined NATO.  A double ** indicates 





 TP1 TP2 TP3 
  1979 - 1991 1992 - 2001 2002 - 2014 
NATO 8,310 5,129 2,507 




Former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia States 
In order to effectively depict the number of terrorist attacks experienced, I included both 
the current member state and its former configuration, i.e. Czechoslovakia became the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia. This group followed a predictable pattern across the three 
time periods, beginning with a low number of attacks, spiking in the second period, then 
dropping again in the third.  The early low numbers could be attributed to a few factors; 
the most common among scholars have to do with the power of the “strong state” in an 
authoritarian regime.  The strength of the Soviet government over the population could 
have contributed to the low number of attacks.  Also, with the assistance of state 
controlled media sources, the number of attacks could have been under-reported.  The 
spike in attacks during the second time period, are likely related to the turbulent 
government transition these countries experienced at the end of the Cold War.  The loss 
of authoritarian control from Soviet supported regimes, a massive increase in domestic 
and international crime, and the democratization of these countries are all probable 
contributors to the increase during this period.  For all of these particular members, the 




  TP1 TP2 TP3 













Soviet Union 77 x x 
Poland (1999) 9 25* 0 
Bulgaria (2004) 11 27 11* 
Estonia (2004) 0 13 1* 
Latvia (2004) 0 15 1* 
Lithuania (2004) 1 7 0* 
Romania (2004) 3 2 1* 
        
Czechoslovakia 6 3 x 
Czech Republic (1999) x 12* 11 
Slovakia (2004) x 17 0* 
          
FY
R
 Yugoslavia 26 173 3 
Croatia (2009) x 49 6* 




Other Strategic Expansion States 
This group of states provided the most interesting results.  Some followed the expected 
pattern that was hypothesized, others followed a similar pattern to the former Soviet 
states, but more importantly some followed neither pattern.  Hungary, Germany, and 
Albania fit the former Soviet group, Spain and Turkey were similar to the Founders group, 
but Greece had its own unique outcome.  Turkey, having the largest number of attacks in 
this group over all three periods, can be explained by a mix of domestic and international 
issues.  Its geography alone can help explain why it has experienced such a greater 
number of attacks than other member states.  Truly this group exemplifies why a nation’s 
own history plays such a crucial role in determining any relationship with the number of 
terrorist attacks that nation will experience. 
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  TP1 TP2 TP3 












 Greece (1952) 404 231** 400 
Turkey (1952) 1832 1233 599 
Germany (1955) 66 481 51 
West Germany (1955) 285 x x 
Spain (1982) 1824* 575 221 
East Germany (1990) 19 x x 
Hungary (1999) 4 36* 4 
Albania (2009) 3 65 5* 
 
Table 3 
   Spain was the most overwhelming supporter of Hypothesis 1, having the most 
significant drop in the number of terrorist attacks after joining NATO.  In the first time 
period, 1277 of 1824 (70%) attacks were perpetrated by Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), 
or the Basque Fatherland and Freedom group.  This is a separatist organization of armed, 
Basque nationalists in northern Spain and southwestern France whose was gaining 
independence for the Greater Basque Country. The group was founded in 1959 and later 
evolved from a group promoting traditional Basque culture to a paramilitary group 
engaged in a violent campaign of bombing, assassinations and kidnappings in the 
Spanish Basque country and throughout Spanish territory. Between 1983 and 1987 a 
"dirty war" ensued by means of the Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación (GAL), or 
Antiterrorist Liberation Groups, a self- identified, counter terrorist, paramilitary group 
active (Romm, 2010). The discovery of the state-sponsored "dirty war" scheme and the 
imprisonment of officials responsible for GAL in the early 1990s led to a political scandal 
in Spain. The group's connections with the state were unveiled by a Spanish journal and 
a national trial was initiated (Sullivan, 1988). In 1992, ETA's three top leaders were 
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arrested, which led to changes in ETA's leadership and direction. As a consequence, the 
group's attacks since the revelation have generally been dubbed state terrorism.  
Greece has dealt with left wing extremist groups for most of the twentieth century.  
The Soviet Union, recognizing the strategic importance of this ancient land in the 
Mediterranean, would have been a powerful influence over pro-Communist, anti-Western 
political and extremist groups throughout the Cold War.  The clear majority of the attacks 
over all three time periods that Greece experienced were from these domestic groups, 
targeting government facilities and officials, banks and other businesses.  There were 
plenty of attacks on US and European targets, but they were a small percentage of the 
overall number.  During the second time period, there was a significant dip, almost by fifty 
percent in the number of attacks that Greece experience, probably due to the loss of the 
Soviet influence over the left wing groups (Kassimeris, 2013).  The sharp increase in the 
third time period, because of a higher percentage of the attacks targeting international 
banking institutions, could be explained by the degrading economic situation Greece has 
experienced during this time period.  Even with the odd numbers from Greece and Spain, 
this group as a whole still fit the hypothesis, with an overall decreasing number of attacks.  
 
Founding Members 
All of the original alliance members (with the exception of France) have maintained a 
steady, healthy relationship with each other in the spirit of cooperative security.  France 
withdrew from the integrated military command in 1966 to pursue an independent defense 
system but returned to full participation on 3 April 2009.  Of this list, the United States, 
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United Kingdom, and France experienced the most terrorist attacks in all three time 
periods, which could be attributed to any number of causal factors theorized in other 
works such as population size and density, and the amount of intervention these three 
countries provide around the globe.  Two members, Norway and Iceland, experienced 
such low numbers that any variation was not seen as significant.  Taken as a whole, the 
founding members experienced fewer terrorist attacks over the three measured time 
periods. 
  TP1 TP2 TP3 














Belgium (1949) 86 22 16 
Canada (1949) 14 26** 22 
Denmark (1949) 21 11 3 
France** (1949) 1236 801 282 
Iceland (1949) 0 2 2 
Italy (1949) 545 104 78 
Luxembourg (1949) 13 3 0 
Netherlands (1949) 52 35 12 
Norway (1949) 6 6 6 
Portugal (1949) 93 5 2 
United Kingdom (1949) 1967 961 557 
United States (1949) 647 382 216 
 
Table 4 
 The one variation from the norm in this group was Canada, which nearly doubled 
the number of terrorist attacks from the first to the second time period.  The majority of 
these attacks were perpetrated by the Earth Liberation Front in response to national policy 
on an oil pipeline on Canadian soil.  This is a domestic issue in a country with large fossil 
fuel deposits and also enormous government protected lands like parks, forests, and 
wildlife refuges.  Other attacks of note were from foreign groups, targeting foreign groups 
within Canadian borders, such as anti-Semitic or anti-Turkish terrorist groups attacking 
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synagogues or the Turkish Embassy.  Like the United States, Canada is a melting pot of 
cultures and backgrounds from around the globe. However, unlike the United States, 
Canada has had a more liberal immigration policy over its history, accepting larger 
numbers of refugees from conflict and natural disaster zones.  Canada’s example 
highlights a recurring situation in developed countries in which two non-host nation 
ideologies are clashing on host country soil (Armenian vs Turkish, Palestinian vs Israeli).   
 
So What? 
The data shows that NATO as an alliance has experienced fewer terrorist attacks over 
the three time periods measured.  While few members showed an increase in the number 
of attacks, it was not significant enough of an increase to alter the total outcome.  Even 
with six waves of expansion, the alliance experienced fewer attacks over time.  The 
majority of the Founding Members showed a significant decline in the number of attacks 
which fit the hypothesis the easiest.  The Former Soviet States, with its spiked increased 
in the second time period, still fit the hypothesis as most of those members saw a rapid 
decrease after joining in the third time period.  The Other Expansion States, with the most 
interesting story to tell, had an overall decrease in the number of attacks which still fit the 
hypothesis.  The outliers of this group were explained with each state’s historical 






PART II – Content Analysis of “Terrorism” in NATO Publications 
NATO has increasingly viewed itself has a counter terrorism institution since the collapse 
of the Soviet Union.  Based on the language used from official declarations and the 
changing security environment, NATO’s perception of threats evolved to match the 
Alliance’s existence and interests.  At the same time, throughout the measured time 
periods, the Alliance still presented itself as a balancing power against Russian 
aggression and sought to expand its influence from the north Atlantic to the Baltic to the 
Mediterranean.  In this section I will highlight that the level of attention given to the terrorist 
threat by the Heads of State of each of the Alliance members illustrate that NATO as a 
whole sees itself as a counter terrorism institution. As discussed in previous chapters, the 
level of consensus among the members ensures that these publications speak for all, and 
are ratified by attending Heads of State.  
 
Number of Meetings 
The majority of the NATO Summit meetings took place during the three time periods 
measured.  They have increased in frequency over the lifespan of the Alliance, which 
could be attributed to any number of factors.  The need to meet and discuss the ever 
changing security environment plus the increased opportunity thanks to advancing global 
communications technology are just two possibilities.  While the Soviet Union and NATO 
both attempted to maintain currency in their strategies and technologies, the mere fact 
that they are large, bureaucratic, state institutions makes for a steady pace of evolution.  
This steady and predictable pace is easy to follow with regularly scheduled gatherings to 
42 
 
discuss future actions.  After the transition from Soviet collapse to the Global War on 
Terror, that predictably was a thing of the past.  NATO needed to hold a meeting of the 
minds more often in order to keep up with the rapidly changing, non-bureaucratic threat 
of international terrorism, all the while being able to maintain its counter balance to a 
growingly aggressive Russia.  This increased pace of meetings supports Hypothesis 2 in 
that increased focus on terrorism shows that the Alliance considers counter terrorism as 
a primary function. 
 
Topics Discussed 
The common topic covered in all three time periods was organizational reform, normal 
updates required year after year.  However, bracketed by the major global events, the 
topics discussed at the Summits did change.  In the first time period the major points of 
discussion expectedly were focused on the threat of Soviet influence and the strategies 
to counter such.  Nuclear proliferation, weapons of mass destruction, reducing the spread 
of conventional arms were all the subjects of the era.  After the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the start of the second time period, the major concern for NATO members was 
the volatile environment facing not only Eastern Europe, but other states across the globe 
that were formerly under Soviet control and patronage.  The danger of former Soviet 
nuclear weapons falling into the hands of dangerous state or non-state actors created a 
call to action for all member states to embrace a plan of action to assist Russia and other 
Soviet satellites in accounting for these devices.  Without a doubt the terrorist attacks on 
11 September 2001 created the greatest disruption to the status quo of NATO priorities.  
For the first time in its history, a member state (US) invoked Article V of the Treaty, 
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obliging the other members to assist in the fight against terror in Afghanistan.  This 
unavoidable call to action had a profound effect on NATO priorities of the third time period, 
increasing the frequency of the Summits and adding to an already lengthy list of topics to 
be discussed. The addition of terrorism topics to the Summits, in that terrorism did not 
replace an existing issue, supports Hypothesis 2, showing that NATO was increasing 
focus and elevating the priority of international terrorism in what it considered the most 
important issues of the member states.  
 
NATO Summit Declarations 









1986 Halifax 9 Arms Control, East-West Relations, Terrorism 
1989 Brussels 37 Strategic Environment, Arms Control 
1990 London 23 Strategic Environment, Org Reforms, WMD, Expansion 
1991 Rome 21 Org Reforms, Strategic Concept, WMD 




1992 Oslo 23 Baltic States, Non-member Partners 
1994 Brussels 26 Org Reforms, Expansion, WMD, Bosnia 
1996 Berlin 26 Org Reforms, Bosnia, Expansion 
1997 Madrid 27 Org Reforms, Expansion, WMD, Strategic Concept 
1999 Washington 65 Strategic Environment, WMD, Expansion 




2002 Prague 19 Expansion, Org Reforms, Terrorism 
2004 Istanbul 46 Afghanistan, Terrorism, Org Reforms, Expansion 
2006 Riga 46 Afghanistan, Non-member Partners, Terrorism, Org Reforms, Expansion 
2008 Bucharest 50 Afghanistan, Kosovo, Terrorism, Expansion, Missile Defense, Org Reforms 
2010 Lisbon 54 Strategic Concept, Missile Defense, Org Reforms 
2012 Chicago 65 Afghanistan, Expansion, Missile Defense, Org Reforms 





Number of Terrorism Topics 
For the purposes of the content analysis I searched each of the NATO Summit 
Declarations for terms such as “terror”, “terrorism”, “terrorists”, and “counter terrorism”.    
For example, in the 1997 Summit in Madrid, there were 27 points covered, and one of the 
coding terms was used just once, and in the 25th point.  For this entry, a Low priority was 
selected due to the percentage of the overall Declaration that focused on one of the terms. 
The language used when discussing the subject suggested that terrorism was a concern 
of the Alliance, but no major response was initiated from the Declaration.    
“We reaffirm the importance of arrangements in the Alliance for consultation on 
threats of a wider nature, including those linked to illegal arms trade and acts of 
terrorism, which affect Alliance security interests.  We continue to condemn all acts 
of international terrorism.  They constitute flagrant violations of human dignity and 
rights and are a threat to the conduct of normal international relations.  In 
accordance with our national legislation, we stress the need for the most effective 
cooperation possible to prevent and suppress this scourge.”  
- Official text: Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation issued 
by the Heads of State and Government at the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council 
 
Another example would be the 2008 Summit in Bucharest that had 50 points, of those 50 
points, 6 different points covered one of the terms.  In those 6 points, one of the terms 
was used 17 times, resulting in a High priority.  The language used when discussing the 
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subject suggested that terrorism was a top priority, and was deserving of a portion of the 
budget, organizational reform, and troop/equipment deployment to engage in conflict.  
“Euro-Atlantic and wider international security is closely tied to Afghanistan’s future 
as a peaceful, democratic state, respectful of human rights and free from the threat 
of terrorism. For that reason, our UN-mandated International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF) mission, currently comprising 40 nations, is our top priority. Working 
with the Afghans, we have made significant progress, but we recognize that 
remaining challenges demand additional efforts. Neither we nor our Afghan 
partners will allow extremists and terrorists to regain control of Afghanistan or use 
it as a base for terror that threatens all of our people. With our ISAF partners, and 
with the engagement of President Karzai, we will issue a statement on 
Afghanistan. This statement sets out a clear vision guided by four principles: a firm 
and shared long-term commitment; support for enhanced Afghan leadership and 
responsibility; a comprehensive approach by the international community, bringing 
together civilian and military efforts; and increased cooperation and engagement 
with Afghanistan’s neighbors, especially Pakistan. We welcome announcements 
by Allies and partners of new force contributions and other forms of support as 
further demonstration of our resolve; and we look forward to additional 
contributions…” 
- Official text: Bucharest Declaration issued by the Heads of State and Government 




NATO Summit Declarations 









1986 9 (#08) 1 M Concern 
1989 37 (#28) 1 L Concern 
1990 23   0 L   
1991 21 (#19) 1 L Planning Consideration 




1992 23   0 L   
1994 26 (#19) 1 L Condemn 
1996 26 (#25) 2 L Concern 
1997 27 (#25) 1 L Condemn 
1999 65   0 L   




2002 19 (#03) (#04) (#07) (#08) (#10) 10 H Mobilize, Transform, Engage 
2004 46 (#10) (#12) (#13) 15 H Mobilize, Transform, Engage 
2006 46 (#02) (#04) (#0) (#20) (#40) (#41) 13 H Mobilize, Transform, Engage 
2008 50 (#06) (#13) (#14) (#15) (#17) (#28) (#29) 17 H Mobilize, Transform, Engage 
2010 54 (#06) (#39) 6 M Engage, Planning Consideration 
2012 65 (#05) (#15) (#38) (#51) 10 H Winning, Transform, Condemn 
2014 113 (#79) 6 M Monitor, Concern 
 
Table 6 is constructed to depict the number of times that a terrorism subject is referenced 
(Coding) in the entire document, how many and which topic points the coding appeared 
in the document (Terrorism Topics), the priority of the terrorism subject compared to other 
subjects (Priority), and the level of position the group took on terrorism in each of the 
Summit Declarations (Response to Terrorism). 
 
 NATO’s attention to terrorism was minimal in the first and second time periods.  
While the obvious focus was on Soviet aggression in Afghanistan, the Alliance still had 
an eye on events surrounding the PLO in the Middle East and the IRA in the United 
Kingdom.  During the second time period, or post-Cold War, NATO’s primary focus was 
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on chaotic situations resulting from the collapse of the Soviet Union and the stockpiles of 
Soviet made conventional weapons.  Former Soviet and Yugoslav states were 
experiencing a spike in terrorist activity with the loss of the repressive regime and 
democratization of the respective governments.  This data clearly shows an increased 
focus on terrorism in the third time period, with a significant jump after the attacks on 11 
September 2001.  The focus peaks in 2008 with NATO forces engage in operations in 
both Iraq and Afghanistan and begins to slowly wane towards 2014.  The introduction of 
the Arab Spring, the operations in Libya, and the explosion of the Islamic State in Syria 
and Iraq have kept member states focused on the threat of international terrorism so far.   
 
So What? 
Based on the analysis of the NATO Summit Declarations, the data clearly shows an 
increased focus on international terrorism from the Alliance as a whole, and thus by each 
member state.  Of note, this increased attention on NATO’s part is reactionary. As in, the 
terrorist attacks did not occur as an Al Qaeda response to an increase in NATO’s counter 
terrorism operations, but in fact the opposite is true.  When looking at the language of the 
documents during the first two time periods, NATO clearly did not see itself as the primary 
counter terrorism force for its member states.  During these two time periods the Alliance 
viewed itself as the collective security apparatus to protect member states from the Soviet 
Union and the fallout of its collapse.  In the case of the third time period, the priority of 
counter terrorism, as shown by the placement of the topic among the list of points 
discussed, was placed at a much higher level.  A key finding from this data is that during 
the third time period, NATO’s focus did not simply turn from Soviet or Russian topics to 
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those of terrorism. In fact, the focus on terrorism was in addition to maintaining a watchful 




















After Evolving, Know Who You Are 
 
Summary 
This study examined the role of NATO in order to determine its relevancy in the fight 
against international terrorism.  As NATO continues to be a post-Cold War, state alliance 
has it been able to transition to a relevant counter terrorism force and reduce the number 
of terrorist attacks within each member state, the alliance as a whole, and/or in the 
international community?  The data from the Global Terrorism Database shows that 
NATO as an alliance has experienced fewer terrorist attacks over the three time periods 
measured, even though the world experienced a decrease in the second time period and 
an increase in the third time period.  Based on the analysis of the NATO Summit 
Declarations, the data clearly shows an increased focus on international terrorism from 
the Alliance as a whole, and thus by each member state.  A key finding from this data is 
that during the third time period, NATO’s focus did not simply turn from Soviet or Russian 
topics to those of terrorism. In fact, the focus on terrorism was in addition to maintaining 
a watchful eye on Russian aggression in regards to the Georgia and Ukraine situations.   
 
Theory Building 
Contrary to the pessimistic assessments of NATO’s future found in the neo-realist 
literature, the expansion of NATO supports two well-established new-realist hypotheses 
about alliance formation and persistence; expansion presents an example of states 
balancing in response to a balance of threats or making a utility calculation that expansion 
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will enhance alliance operational capabilities or further its strategic objectives.  If Article 
V is considered as the sole characteristic of the Alliance and reason for existence, then 
the contribution expansion makes to the collective defense is the definite criterion for 
assessing the future of the Alliance.  Even if NATO were defined by Article V alone, it is 
clear that the Allied effort to discharge the obligation to collective defense against the 
threat posed by al Qaeda and associated terrorist groups has been facilitated by the 
strategic depth provided by expansion.  If non-Article V operations are considered as part 
of the raison d’etre of the Alliance and an auxillary dimension of collective defense, then 
the willingness to enlarge the Alliance would reflect the necessity of adding strategic 
depth to the Alliance to meet security challenges emanating along entire eastern and 
southern borders.  On the demand side, the neo-realist proposition is even more 
compelling: states seeking membership have clearly engaged in the process of strategic 
bandwagoning against possible regional threats to national sovereignty or territory and 
seek NATO membership as the guarantor of national security.  The demand for expansion 
could also be assessed as reflecting, at a minimum, a tactical bandwagoning towards 
gaining access to NATO resources for the purposes of modernizing national military 
forces and infrastructure.  The expansion process then benefits the whole of the 
organization with respect to the security and collective defense capabilities compared to 
the pre-expansion membership that benefits the aspirant state. 
Neoliberal institutionalism does not necessarily reject a neo-realist explanation for 
NATO’s post-war origins and persistence, but casts a broader argument that NATO 
persisted not only because of the Soviet threat, but because NATO provided an 
institutional mechanism for resolving intramural conflicts of interest with respect to the 
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definition of threat and the best way to meet those threats.  The evolution of NATO 
strategies reveal an adaptation to a new strategic context that has recognized a new 
range of security threats outside the Article V responsibilities of the Alliance (Robertson, 
2003).  Expansion has supported applicant state progress towards the operational 
objectives of modernization as well as the acceptance of Alliance norms (collective 
defense obligation, consensus goal, etc.).  It has also provided NATO with an opportunity 
to test whether the applicant states will meet their contractual obligation to the Alliance 
prior to membership.  Moreover, this process creates transparency in aspirant-state 
defense planning and ensures that strategic and defense concepts are consistent with 
NATO practice and doctrine.  Additionally, post membership behavior has not led to 
crowding out; there has not been a deterioration in the ability of the Alliance to reach 
consensus (at least not in the behavior of the new members) and there has been an 
increase in Alliance cohesion, perhaps demonstrated most convincingly in the significant 
contributions of new members to out of area operations.  Finally the new member states 
have met the expectation that expansion should not lead to a deterioration of the 
Alliance’s operational capabilities; their willingness to operate in multinational brigades 
and to develop niche capabilities have made a positive operational contribution to the 
Alliance.  Expansion, therefore, represents an institutional adaptation to a changed 
strategic context, has preserved the integrity of Article V obligations and institutional 







The NATO security strategies may be assessed comparatively along the self-ascribed 
role and strategic purpose of the Alliance itself.  These strategies have been subject to 
modification and revisions over time in response to external shocks or the emergence of 
new security problems, supplemented by auxiliary statements, particularly on terrorism 
and weapons of mass destruction.  The supplementary statements on security 
preoccupations in conjunction with the framing “headline” security statements, most 
recently the 2010 Strategic Concept, provide a firm foundation for assessing the 
admixture of complementarity and rivalry that characterizes the critical institutional 
relationship between NATO and the European Union.   
The dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, the emergence of contested 
and weak states within Europe, and the malevolent role of non-state actors created a new 
set of security threats and concerns that diminished the immediacy of NATO’s two key 
functions as an alliance: the Article V collective defense obligation and the credibility of 
the American nuclear guarantee backing it.  The disintegration and civil conflicts plaguing 
the former Yugoslavia nonetheless underscored the continuing threat of military conflict 
in Europe, albeit far short of an Article V contingency.   
The rationale for NATO extended beyond Article V and collective defense 
consequently, any assessment of the impact that expansion will or has had on NATO may 
not be restricted to the narrow criterion of successfully discharging the Article V obligation.  
The expansion process represents a successful adaptation of the Alliance to a changed 
external environment and perception of threat.  Although expansion also required the 
conformity of the accession states to the requirements of collective defense, the offer of 
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membership arose from the need to adapt to a changed threat environment that shifted 
the priority from the relatively narrow task of collective defense to the more encompassing 
task of collective security.   
The rising salience of non-Article V threats was derived from the securitization of 
terrorism, failed states, energy, and economic infrastructure, and drove this 
transformation and adaption of the Alliance.  This securitization process accelerated after 
2001 and became inextricably linked with the dual threats of transnational organized 
crime and terrorism, particularly one inspired or directed by al Qaeda (Kaplan, 2011).  The 
Alliance viewed expansion as a mechanism for fostering transparency in defense 
planning, strengthening the effectiveness and cohesion of the Alliance, and fostering the 
patterns and habits of cooperation, consultation and consensus building within the 
Alliance’s institutional framework. 
 States aspiring to become NATO members sought to become fully integrated into 
the Alliance’s security system and to modernize national forces.  The Czech Republic, 
Hungary, and Poland similarly claimed that NATO membership would provide an 
opportunity to participate meaningfully in humanitarian and peacekeeping operations 
without risking national security, facilitate the rationalization of national defense efforts, 
thereby facilitating a capability based specialization of national armed forces or a broader 
division of labor with the Alliance, and improve the combat effectiveness of national armed 
forces through the NATO planning process.  For the larger members, NATO membership 
has also been viewed as an essential institutional framework for enabling the newer 
members to become fully integrated in the Alliance’s security system and to modernize 
national forces.   
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The most important contribution that NATO membership has made to the Baltic 
States’ defense policies and military force structures has been to connect a process of 
“Baltification” with the development of force specialization within the Alliance as a whole 
(Webber, Sperling, & Smith, 2010). As was the case for the three Baltic states, NATO 
membership provided Slovakia, Slovenia, and the two Black Sea accession states with a 
framework for defense modernization, interoperability with Allied forces and participation 
in multilateral operations, all of which were deemed essential tasks if they were to meet 
the probable threats to national security.  These same broad concerns and advantages 
were identified for Georgia and Ukraine as factors impelling them to seek membership.  
Georgia and Ukraine viewed the accession process as a way to align the modernization 
of national forces with NATO standards, an institutionalized framework for participation in 
peacekeeping and anti-terrorism operations, and enhancing regional stability by 
facilitating the Open Door in to the Black and Caspian Sea regions. 
 The offer of expansion and the demand to join the Alliance constitute evidence that 
the institutional adaptation of NATO to the changed strategic context was successful.  The 
power vacuum that emerged in central and Eastern Europe after the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union created the potential for a destabilized region caught between the highly 
institutionalized Atlantic security system and an enfeebled Russian Federation interested 
primarily in reclaiming its former prerogatives in the region.  This geopolitical calculation 
was reinforced by the changed security agenda and emergence of non-state actors as 
the primary agents of threat (Webber, Sperling, & Smith, 2010).  The offer of NATO 
membership, and the adoption of common policies and strategies to address the trans-
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boundary challenges of terrorism and transnational organized crime linked to it, would 
enhance the ability of the Alliance to adapt to the requirements of collective security. 
 
Limitations and Future Research 
In the analysis of terrorist activity there are limitations that are characteristic of all studies.  
Information about terrorists and terror organizations available to the public and to scholars 
is typically limited, especially if there is a related terror campaign in progress.  Terror 
organizations are typically secretive to begin with, so communicating with them for 
research purposes while the organization is being hunted my international military forces 
could be ill advised.  In the cases of suicide terrorist attacks, the possibility of an interview 
with the attacker is incredibly low.  Understanding the motivations and ideology of 
terrorists and terror organizations is usually limited to the broadcast message of the 
organization, which may or may not be the actual truth.  The data on the number of attacks 
is constrained by the transparency of the state in which the attack(s) occur.  As seen in 
more authoritarian regimes like the Soviet Union, China, or Yugoslavia, it is not beneficial 
to the regime to acknowledge the existence of dissenters, or any successes they may 
have.  This of course limits the amount of data available on the number of attacks when 
researching certain countries.   
 With respect to counter terrorism efforts, again the data is limited, especially if 
involving an ongoing campaign.  Military and law enforcement forces will resist sharing 
too much information with the public so as to not show their hand to the terrorist 
organization.  Counter terrorism efforts are increasingly effective when the terrorist 
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organization does not suspect any infiltration in their ranks by enemy forces.  In a world 
of conflict does the absence of hostilities mean a successful peace process, or just the 
absence of hostile capabilities or will to fight?  This question is very relevant in the counter 
terrorism subject.  A decrease in terrorist activity does not necessarily correlate to an 
increase in counter terrorism efforts, nor is the opposite true.  Every conventional conflict 
between states experiences surges and lulls in activity.  As discussed in regards to 
Rapoport’s waves of terror, terrorist organizations wax and wane in size and activity, 
clearly evident in the data of terrorist attacks.   
 Challenges and advantages exist when researching a state to state alliance such 
as NATO.  Because the member states of the organization are predominantly transparent 
democracies, information is readily available to the public.  Strategies and policies are 
available to enhance the public’s trust with the organization.  On the other hand, being a 
military alliance does close quite a few doors to a vault of sensitive information that only 
the military leaders and heads of state will have access to. This holds true for the Alliance 
as well as for each of the member states.  When deciding which documents to examine 
for the content analysis portion of this study, availability to the public was one of the key 
criteria for selection.   
 To increase the validity of this particular study, access to sensitive information 
would be helpful.  In order to understand the flow of counter terrorism capabilities from 
the Alliance to each of the new member states, there are several pathways that could be 
examined.  The content of any of the large military exercises that NATO has conducted 
with member states would be helpful in determining if procedures and tactics were being 
shared from the group to the member.  Lists of technology and weaponry that are shared, 
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and their respective capabilities would offer insight into the types of conflict NATO is 
preparing each member state for.  Of course the most helpful, and yet the least likely to 
be available, would be the amount and types of intelligence that the Alliance is sharing 
with new member states in regards to terrorist organizations and their activity.  
 The methodology of this study would be useful in understanding the other 
functions, outside of counter terrorism, that NATO serves.  Being closely related to 
terrorism, piracy on the seas and transnational organized crime are two other threats to 
collective security that could be examined with the same model.  These two threats, just 
like terrorism, would require a close relationship between the Alliance and civilian 
authorities in order to effectively counter.  Research of NATO’s efforts to minimize these 
threats could offer a similar analysis of the relevance of the Alliance in regards to those 
specific functions.  
 
Conclusion 
I have illustrated in this study that for a nation, while there are many advantages to joining 
NATO, one valuable outcome is a decrease in terrorist attacks within that nation’s 
borders.  The theories of neoliberal institutionalism and the four waves of terrorism 
provided the framework for this study to build upon.  The two pronged analysis showed 
that membership in the Alliance, coupled with the commitment shown by NATO published 
documents correlate to a decrease in the number of terrorist attacks a member, and 
NATO as a whole experiences.  The key factors that had to be considered was that NATO 
as an organization passed on the knowledge and capabilities of counter terrorism to its 
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new members and that each Summit Declaration, based on alliance consensus 
principles, indicated a specific self-identity with counter terrorism as a proclaimed 
function.  Security threats to states, whether by state or non-state actors, will continue to 
evolve in type and lifespan.  This study, among others will show that NATO will continue 
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